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I. INTRODUCTION 
Unlike other defenses/ the permissibility of self-defense has 
hardly been the subject of controversy.2  Philosophers and lawyers have 
tended to agree not only that it  is permissible, but about the sorts of 
cases to which its permissibility applies . Even supposed marginal cases, 
such as attacks by insane or incompetent aggressors, have not gener­
ated much controversy, and a general consensus in favor of permissibil­
ity in such cases has emerged. 3 A certain class of cases of recent inter-
* Acting Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to thank 
Kurt Baier, Meir Dan-Cohen, Peter Detre, Joshua Dressler, George Fletcher, David Gauthier, 
Sanford Kadish, and Bailey Kuklin for comments on drafts and for discussions on the topic of this 
article. 
1. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW§ 10.3 .1 (1978) (arguing 
that duress expresses theory of excuses that could absorb entire criminal law); Mark Kelman, 
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591, 643-44 (1981) 
(arguing that duress defense represents severe threat to ordinary criminal law discourse). 
2. Even some pacifists accept the permissibility of self-defense. See Cheney C. Ryan, Self­
Defense, Pacifism. and the Possibility of Killing, 93 ETHICS 508, 510 (1983) (arguing that prob­
lem of self-defense for the pacifist is not problem of whether self-defense is permissible, but rather 
of why it is permissible). 
3. See generally George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A 
Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REv. 367 (1973); Jeff McMahan, Self-De­
fense and the Problem of the Innocent Attacker, 104 ETHICS 252 (1994); Judith J. Thomson, 
Self-Defense, 20 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 283 (1991). But see Michael Otsuka, Ki/ling the Innocent in 
Self-Defense, 23 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 74 (1994) (arguing that impermissibility of killing innocent 
bystanders entails that of killing innocent threats and insane aggressors). 
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est among legal commentators, however, pressures the rationale for the 
defense and suggests the need for reexamination . This is the class of 
killings of abusive partners at the hands of their victims, where self­
defense as traditionally understood is often inapplicable because the ag­
gressor's attack was not sufficiently imminent or certain to occur.4 We 
might think of these as near self-defense cases, that is, cases in which a 
defendant is motivated by the desire to protect herself against unlawful 
aggression, but in which her legal claim of self-defense fails because 
one or more of the legal requirements for the defense is not met.11 
In focusing on what I am calling "near" self-defense cases, I am 
laying to one side two other types of cases . On the one hand, I leave 
aside cases in which the defendant's claim falls squarely within the pa­
rameters of traditional self-defense doctrine.6 While courts may not al­
ways have recognized the applicability of self-defense to such situa­
tions,7 the objections to such cases are practical and political, not 
philosophical .  On the other hand, I do not address cases in which a 
victim of abuse kills her abuser where the defendant would more ap­
propriately assert one of the other standard legal defenses, such as in­
sanity or provocation.8 Such cases raise no question of interest for the 
doctrine of self-defense. 
If we restrict our focus to near self-defense cases, the following 
difficulty emerges. Courts and commentators have come increasingly to 
believe that the right of self-defense should extend to a number of cases 
4. See, e.g, State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1 989) (holding self-defense instruction 
properly denied for defendant who shot husband while latter was sleeping). 
5 .  Near self-defense should not be confused with the doctrine of imperfect self-defense. The 
latter refers to cases in which a defendant is unreasonable in his belief in the need for defensive 
force. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 207 (2d ed. 1 995) (defining imperfect 
self-defense as killing with unreasonable belief that factual circumstances justify killing) .  I leave 
such cases out of what I am calling near self-defense. Imperfect self-defense, moreover, is only a 
doctrine of mitigation. See State v. Powell, 4 1 9  A.2d 406 (N.J. 1 980) (allowing imperfect self­
defense to reduce second-degree murder to manslaughter) .  The cases of near self-defense we shall 
consider, however, will be those in which a complete defense seems warranted. 
6. See Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals, 1 40 U. PA. L. REv. 379, 384 ( 1 9 9 1 )  (presenting evidence that major­
ity of cases where battered women kill fit model of standard, confrontational self-defense). 
7. See id. (arguing that high reversal of battered woman self-defense cases is due to trial 
judges' "refus[al] to apply long-standing principles of substantive, evidential, and procedural 
law"). 
8. See, e.g. ,  State v. Burton, 464 So. 2d 421 (La. Ct. App. 1 985)  (rejecting battered woman 
syndrome as supportive of insanity plea when defendant pleaded not guilty to manslaughter by 
reason of insanity); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1 98 1 )  (admitting expert testimony on 
battered woman syndrome to support possible defense of provocation); State v. Briand, 547 A.2d 
235 (N.H. 1988) (same) . 
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in which the traditional legal requirements for the defense are not 
met.9  The refusal to allow Judy Norman's claim of self-defense to go to 
a jury, for example, has provoked widespread criticism, despite Nor­
man's evident failure to satisfy the imminence requirement.10 While the 
sense that defendants like Norman merit exoneration may not be uni­
versally shared, it appears to be sufficiently common to raise the follow­
ing question: Is there a coherent account of self-defense that would ex­
tend the defense to cases like Norman's, where the defendant is clearly 
motivated by self-preservation, and indeed where her fear for her life 
seems reasonable under the circumstances ? The sort of account re­
quired is a highly subjective one, focusing on defendants' reasons for 
acting over and above the objective elements of their situations . My 
question, then, is about the theoretical rationale for a defense with this 
shape. In what follows, I shall argue that if self-defense is to be con­
ceived primarily as a defense based on reasons for acting, it must be 
understood quite differently from the way in which self-defense is com­
monly viewed. The common view, articulated in different variations, is 
that self-defense is a justification . This view of self-defense is so widely 
shared that it is espoused by lawyers and philosophers, rights-based 
theorists and utilitarians alike .11 In this article, however, I sketch a 
view which challenges this received wisdom, one that would regard the 
right to kill in self-defense as a weaker right than has been tradition­
ally supposed. On the view I trace, self-defense should be thought of as 
a species of excuse, in particular, a kind of excuse I shall call "rational 
excuse. "12 
The claim that self-defense should be conceived as an excuse will 
depend most heavily on arguments against a j ustification picture of 
9. See, e.g., Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence and Women Who Kill Their 
Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 3 7 1  ( 1 993). 
1 0. State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1 989). Judy Norman killed her husband while he 
was sleeping, following a prolonged and vicious beating and threats by him to kill her, and fearing 
a resumption of violence when he awoke. Although an intermediate appellate court held the trial 
court's failure to instruct on self-defense was improper, the Court of Appeals reinstated the trial 
court's verdict on grounds that the imminence requirement was not satisfied. 
II. See FLETCHER, supra note 1, § 1 0.5.4; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusTIN W. Scorr, JR .. 
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1 986); Sanford H. Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights 
in the Criminal Law, 64 CAL. L. REv. 871  ( 1 976); Thomson, supra note 3 .  
1 2. Only one other commentator, to  my knowledge, has argued that self-defense should be 
thought of as an excuse. See Cathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Histor­
ical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REv. II ( 1 986). One essen­
tial difference between our approaches is that Rosen would allow the excuse for unreasonable 
actors, whereas I would not. 
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self-defense. The initial implausibility of this negative claim may stem 
from a certain equivocation about the meaning of the term "justifica­
tion." Justification appears to be broader in ordinary language than it 
is in the criminal law. In the criminal law, to call a violation of a pro­
hibitory norm justified is to say not only that it is permissible, but that 
it is encouraged. In ordinary language, by contrast, to say an act is 
justified is to say only that it is permissible. Moral philosophers have 
mostly followed ordinary usage in this regard. 13  The common and phil­
osophical senses of justification should therefore be understood as ap­
plying to all of the criminal law's justifications, plus the intermediate 
category I call "rational excuse." The claim that killing in self-defense 
is not justified killing will seem less counterintuitive in the narrower, 
criminal law sense of the term .  
O n  the excuse side, the initial implausibility of my thesis will stem 
from the fact that excuses are normally associated with lack of respon­
sibility. I wish to suggest the applicability of excuse, however, where 
there is no relevant psychological impairment. Excuse should be availa­
ble in cases where the ground for exoneration lies in the content of an 
agent's reason for doing what she did . Rational excuses thus share a 
characteristic with justifications : they apply to actions done for a rea­
son, where the excuse itself provides the reason for the violation of the 
prohibitory norm. 14 As I shall argue, however, a defense which falls in 
this category lacks the primary identifying characteristic of justifica­
tions in the criminal law - the endorsement of the agent's behavior. 
Elsewhere I have suggested that the defense of duress should also be 
thought of as exoneration of intentional, non justified conduct. H >  In this 
sense, defenses like duress and, as I argue, self-defense, are situated 
between full  moral endorsement and lack of responsibility. 
My argument will proceed as follows. In the next part, I argue in 
favor of the law's motivation-based approach to self-defense, rej ecting 
what I call the "bifurcation strategy," namely a position that treats a 
purely motivation-based defense under the heading of "putative," 
1 3. While she does not explicitly use the term "justification," Judith Thomson contrasts an 
action's being excused with an action's being permissible. The suggestion as far as justification is 
concerned is that a justification is a mere permission to do a prohibited act. Thomson, supra note 
3, at 283 .  
1 4. I mean here to reject the possibility that the act is done for a reason under a different 
description from the one to which the excuse applies. 
1 5. See Claire 0. Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense in Law, 37 
ARIZ. L. REV. 25 1 ( 1 995)  (arguing for a conception of duress as an excuse not premised on lack of 
responsibility). The label "rational excuse," however, is new to this article. 
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rather than actual, self-defense. I also argue, however, that the bifurca­
tion theorists are right to rej ect the motivation-based account of justifi­
cation . These two theses in combination entail that self-defense should 
be thought of as an excuse. In part III ,  I turn to the wider philosophi­
cal background to the notion of justification. I consider a conception of 
justification which, like the view of rational excuse for which I argue, 
focuses on agent-motivation, namely the Hobbesian conception . Insofar 
as it combines a focus on motivation with the justification picture of 
self-defense, the Hobbesian view represents the position towards which 
modern law tends.  But the law does not take a consistently Hobbesian 
approach. Instead, it stands midway between the Hobbesian view and 
an older, quite limited picture of justification, one that regards justifi­
cation as sharply limited to state action undertaken on behalf of collec­
tive welfare. In part IV, I offer a possible philosophical rationale for 
the older, more limited conception: other-regarding actions undertaken 
in defense of certain interests have a moral priority over comparable 
self-regarding actions . Insofar as it is self-regarding, on this view, kill­
ing or harming another in self-defense cannot be justified; it can, how­
ever, be permitted under the moral framework of excuse. In part V, I 
explore the doctrinal implications of conceiving of self-defense as a mo­
tivation-based excuse. Finally in part VI,  I return to the battered wo­
man cases that prompted our investigation, arguing that the notion of 
"rational excuse" helps to resolve the tension between intuition and 
doctrine in such cases. 
II .  DEFENSES FOR BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL 
A. Self-Defense on a Justification Theory 
In his contribution to the present symposium, George Fletcher ar­
gues that the central legal requirements of self-defense should be un­
derstood as mandated by the defense's nature as a justification.16 The 
imminence requirement, for example, establishes the essential dividing 
line between retaliatory and defensive behavior.17 The requirement that 
the original use of force be unlawful is explained as ensuring that de­
fensive force is employed as a matter of right .18 Similarly, the necessity 
requirement distinguishes justified from merely tolerated or excused 
16. See George Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 553 (1996). 
17. !d. at 556-57. 
18. !d. at 558-59. 
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conduct/9 and proportionality serves a similar function. 2° Fletcher's 
suggestion is that defensive killing cannot be justified unless the above 
conditions are met . 
Let us restrict our attention for the moment to the necessity re­
quirement.  One line of argument against a justification picture of self­
defense would run as follows: actual necessity is a requirement of justi­
fication. But actual necessity is not required for self-defense. This 
shows that self-defense cannot be a justification. 
There are two obvious avenues for rej ecting this argument. The 
first is the law's solution: actual necessity is never required for justifica­
tion. It is sufficient under prevailing American law that the defendant 
had a reasonable belief in the need to use defensive force.21 The second 
is Fletcher's solution, namely to treat cases in which necessity is lack­
ing as cases of mistaken self-defense, and then to allow for an excuse of 
"putative," rather than actual, self-defense.22 It is because I side with 
Fletcher on the nature of justification, but with the law in its focus on 
the defendant's  state of mind for purposes of self-defense, that I am 
drawn to the excuse picture of self-defense. Each of these elements re­
quires substantiation, however . 
First we must ask what reasons there might be to regard actual, 
rather than merely perceived, necessity as a requirement of justifica­
tion. As Paul Robinson has argued, justification is obj ective, in the 
sense that it applies to cases in which no "bad act" has occurred. 
Where actual justification is present, nothing has happened that should 
attract the attention of the criminal law.23  In  a case of mistake about 
the availability of a justification, by contrast, a bad act has occurred, 
and thus the law cannot justify the conduct if it is to exonerate the 
19. !d. at 5 59 .  
20 .  !d. at 559-60. 
21. The Model Penal Code consistently allows actors to avail themselves of a justification 
defense where they are mistaken about the availability of the justification, see M ODEL PENAL 
CODE §§ 3.02, 3 .04 (1985) ,  with the caveat that actors who are negligent or reckless in their 
belief can be convicted of a crime for which the required mens rea is negligence or recklessness, as 
the case may be, see MODEL PENAL CODE § §  3 .02(2), 3 .09(2) (1985). Some commentators side 
with the law's approach, dispensing with the requirement of actual necessity for justification. See, 
e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 
1897, 1908-09 (1984) (arguing that reasonable belief is sufficient for justification); Arthur Rip­
stein, Self-Defense and Inequalities of Power, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 685 (1996) (same) . 
22. Fletcher, supra note 1, at § 10.1.2. 
23. Paul H. Robinson, Competing Theories of Justification: Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM 
AND CuLPABILITY (A.T.H. Smith & A. Simester eds., forthcoming) (manuscript on file with 
author). 
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defendant. Justification is about doing good in the world, or at least 
about minimizing harm.24 It applies to cases in which the defendant 
has brought about no net harm, not to cases in which he merely thinks 
he has done so.25 Robinson calls this the "deeds" view of justifica­
tion - the view that justification should turn on what is done-and he 
contrasts it with the "reasons" view - the view that justifications should 
turn on the agent's reason for acting. Accordingly, Robinson thinks jus­
tification should be available to an agent who was unaware of the exis­
tence of the justification at the moment of action. In the case of self­
defense, this view has few supporters .26 But accepting actual necessity 
as a condition of justification does not inexorably commit one to ex­
tending justifications to una ware actors. One might see justification as 
requiring both that the agent did what would minimize harm, and that 
she did what she did for that reason . This is obviously only a gesture in 
the direction of an argument for a sensible obj ectivism about justifica­
tion. While I cannot offer a fuller argument for the point here, I do not 
have much to add to the compelling arguments others have made for 
this position.  For anyone already convinced of the salience of actual 
necessity to justification, at any rate, there is an argument for treating 
self-defense as an excuse. 
The alternative, however, to the excuse theory is the view I pointed 
to above. It is the view that consists in distinguishing "putative" from 
actual self-defense, restricting self-defense to cases in which there is 
actual necessity, and treating mistake cases under the theory of ex­
cuse.27 I shall call this the "bifurcation strategy." In order for the law's 
focus on motivation to provide us with a reason to turn to an excuse 
theory of self-defense, then, we require an argument against the bifur­
cation strategy, that is, an argument to the effect that all self-defense­
type cases should be treated alike. Let us call this the "unity" require­
ment. One argument in favor of such a requirement is simply that it 
24. A rights-based approach to justification would of course deny this characterization. We 
shall turn to such views below. See infra part I I I .  
25 .  Robinson, supra note 23, manuscript at 2. Robinson suggests that there might neverthe­
less be attempt liability in such a case. 
26. 2 PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 122 (1984); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, 
TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 504 (2d ed. 1983) ("The law would be oppressive if it said: It is 
true that you took this action because you felt it in your bones that you were in peril, and it is true 
that you were right, but you cannot now assign reasonable grounds for your belief, so you were 
only right by a fluke and will be convicted."). Williams does not, however, address the case of the 
actor completely unaware of justifying circumstances, but rather the case of someone who has no 
reasonable belief in the need to use defensive force. 
27. Fletcher, supra note I, at § 10 .(2; Robinson, supra note 23, manuscript at 33-34. 
628 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5 7 :62 1 
seems odd to treat differently two defendants who, from their perspec­
tives, do exactly the same thing. We would not, for example, attempt to 
correct the reasoning or methodology of the "putatively" exonerated 
defendant; in this sense we regard him as morally on a par with the 
justified actor. But if this is true, the legal doctrines of exoneration 
should be the same in both cases : both defendants should be excused or 
both should be justified . 
Perhaps a stronger argument in favor of the unity requirement is 
that the two categories-actual and putative self-defense - do not cover 
all of the cases in which we wish to exonerate defendants : they fail ,  in 
particular, to cover those near self-defense cases which are not a matter 
of potential mistake. For if, on the bifurcation strategy, we extend a 
justification to defendants who actually meet the requirements for self­
defense, and an excuse to those whose reasonable beliefs are such that 
the conditions for self-defense would be satisfied if correct, then there 
can be no defense for a defendant who acts on a motivation of self­
preservation, but who, for example, does not herself believe the harm is 
imminent. Judy Norman does not have even a claim of "putative" self­
defense. Again, many may think she should not have a defense to mur­
der. I am not here arguing that she should. Rather, in view of what I 
take to be a growing consensus in favor of extending a defense to a 
defendant l ike Norman, my question is whether there is a plausible 
theory of self-defense that would extend the defense to her. My point 
here is simply that the notion of putative self-defense does not provide 
such a theory. 
In order to extend self-defense to cases where the imminence re­
quirement is not even "putatively" satisfied, the preferred solution has 
been to replace "imminence" with "immediate necessity," allowing a 
defendant to use force in self-defense where the use of force is immedi­
ately required, even if the harm she seeks to avoid is not immediately 
forthcoming.28 This solution, however, would still probably not exoner-
28. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONST. STAT . § 505(a) (1983)  ("use of force upon or toward another 
person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary"); M ODEL 
PENAL CoDE § 3 .04 ( 1985)  (actor must believe use of force is "immediately necessary for purpose 
of protecting himself against use of unlawful force") . The MPC specifically intended to eliminate 
the strict imminence requirement. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3 .04, cmt. 2(c) . Courts, however, do 
not appear to have accepted the relaxed time frame, even in jurisdictions which statutorily require 
only "immediate necessity." Commonwealth v. Grove, 526 A.2d 369, 373-74 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1987) .  The "immediately necessary" standard, however, appears to be the favorite of commenta­
tors. See Robert F. Schopp et a!., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Dis­
tinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL L. REv. 45, 66-67 (giving example of 
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ate Norman, smce although the use of force may be eventually neces­
sary under the circumstances, it may not be necessary to kill now. The 
moment chosen might be one of any number of propitious moments for 
killing someone who will almost certainly kill you if you do not kill 
him . Accordingly, it has also been suggested that the imminence re­
quirement might be eliminated altogether, on the grounds that the ne­
cessity requirement is adequate by itself to screen out cases in which 
the defense should not apply.29 The argument is that there is no reason 
to require a defendant to wait until the last possible moment to avert 
an attack, and that we should allow the defense whenever the defend­
ant can credibly claim she would have faced serious physical harm 
without the use of protective force. 30 Thus, if we wish to extend the 
defense to someone in Norman's position, we would do best to side with 
those who suggest the complete elimination of the imminence 
requirement . 
In addition, courts have increasingly adopted a subj ective ap­
proach to the question of reasonableness . This is because at least a 
thoroughly objective approach to that question will leave out the par­
ticular characteristics that might require a defendant who is much 
smaller and weaker than the aggressor to use force earlier than the 
hypothetical reasonable person .31 On a slightly less extreme version of 
the objective approach, one considers whether a reasonable person in 
the actor's situation would think defensive force necessary, where the 
hiker in desert who will have only source of water poisoned if he does not kill second hiker now); 2 
ROBINSON, supra note 26, § 13 1 (c) ( I) ("The proper inquiry is not the immediacy of the threat 
but the immediacy of the response necessary in defense. If a threatened harm is such that it 
cannot be avoided if the intended victim waits until the last moment, the principle of self-defense 
must permit him to act earlier-as early as is required to defend himself effectively."); WILLIAMS, 
supra note 26, at 503 ("The use of force may be immediately necessary to prevent an attack in 
the future."). 
29.  See Rosen, supra note 9 (issue for jury should be whether defendant reasonably be­
lieved defensive force was necessary, not whether threat was imminent) . 
30. The added advantage of the pure necessity standard over the "immediately necessary" 
standard is that the former may take care of the failure to retreat cases as well: if a defendant can 
take refuge from her attacker only by remaining out of public circulation, her use of protective 
force can be shown to be "necessary," although perhaps not "immediately necessary," as long as 
the Ia w does not want to require her to spend the rest of her life indoors. 
3 1 .  See State v. Baker, 644 P.2d 365, 368 (Idaho 1 982) ( instruction that would "encourage 
the jury to focus upon a defendant's subjective fears . . .  would be contrary to the reasonableness 
requirement" for self-defense); People v. Cisneros, 110 Cal. Rptr. 269, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973) 
("In acting in self-defense the person assailed is not entitled to act upon a subjective standard. "); 
State v. Cadotte, 42 P. 857 (Mont. 1895) (proper measure of circumstances justifying killing in 
self-defense is reasonable person, not person in particular class of men to which defendant 
belongs) . 
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physical characteristics of the defendant are included in "the actor's 
situation . "32 But even the more moderate test will work to the exclusion 
of many of the cases we are calling near self-defense, because it leaves 
out both the personal history of the defendant and the general psycho­
logical effects of being subjected to years of abuse.33 On the subjective 
approach, by contrast, as one court has said, "defendant's actions are 
to be judged against her own subjective impressions and not those 
which a detached jury might determine to be obj ectively reasonable. "34 
The subjective approach thus makes possible not only consideration of 
the pattern of abuse that the defendant has come from past experience 
to expect, but also the admissibility of psychological testimony about 
the "normal" responses of victims of battering.311 
When we combine these several aspects of contemporary self-de­
fense law, the fol lowing picture emerges. In order to make a valid 
claim of self-defense, a defendant need only have a reasonable belief 
that the use of force under the circumstances was necessary in  order to 
avert a perceived attack. Reasonableness is assessed from the defend­
ant's perspective, taking into account her subjective peculiarities and 
past experiences. This turns self-defense into a defense based almost 
exclusively on motivation: it  says that a defendant can do whatever she 
believes necessary to avert an attack by an aggressor, provided that her 
32. State v. Wanrow, 559  P.2d 548,  558 (Wash. 1 987)  (reasonableness interpreted so as to 
allow consideration of defendant's physical vulnerability) .  The Wanrow case required the court 
only to take a more flexible approach to objective reasonableness, although dicta in that case is 
often cited in support of the subjective approach. See infra note 33 .  For other intermediate, objec­
tive approaches, see Hart v. State, 637 S.2d 1 329, 1 339 (Miss. 1 994) ("The defendant is judged 
not according to his own particular mental frailties, but by a 'reasonable person' standard."); 
People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 1 67, 179 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 989) (" [T]he reasonableness of the de­
fendant's belief that self-defense is necessary . . .  do [es] not call for an evaluation of the defend­
ant's subjective state of mind.") . 
33 .  Wanrow, 559  P.2d at 558 .  The Model Penal Code's approach is another variation of the 
subjective approach: " [T]he use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the 
actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 
against the use of force by such other person on the present occasion." MODEL PENAL CODE 
§ 3 .04( 1 )  (emphasis added). 
34. Wanrow, 559  P.2d at 5 55 .  
3 5 .  State v .  Hundley, 693 P.2d 475 ,  478-80 (Kan. 1 985)  (correct standard i s  "how a rea­
sonably prudent battered wife would perceive [husband's] demeanor," but referring to this as 
application of objective test); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 3 1 2, 3 1 6  (Wash. 1 984) (en bane) (evi­
dence of battered woman syndrome "may have substantial bearing on the woman's perceptions 
and behavior at the time of the killing and is central to her claim of self-defense"); State v. 
Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 8 1 1 , 8 1 8  (N.D. 1 983)  ("a correct statement of the law of self-defense is 
one in which the court directs the jury to assume the physical and psychological properties pecu­
liar to the accused"). 
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belief meets some sort of minimal standard of rationality, considered 
from the standpoint of someone in the defendant's position and with 
the defendant's psychological profile. 
My claim, then, is simply that if one is inclined to accept the 
above parameters for the defense, one should also find an excuse for­
mulation attractive, insofar as it al lows one to avoid bifurcation . Meth­
odologically, a nonbifurcated approach to these cases seems defensible: 
one starts with the group of cases in which one is inclined to allow the 
defense and then locates the lowest common denominator across all 
such cases . My claim, then, is that proceeding in this way one is inevi­
tably pulled towards a subj ectification of self-defense, because the low­
est common denominator of the near self-defenses cases (at least where 
exoneration seems appropriate) and the regular self-defense cases taken 
together is the belief on the part of the agent that the use of force was 
necessary to avert death or serious bodily injury, along with a judgment 
that such belief was reasonable. What I think this shows is that the 
element that most strongly inclines us to allow a claim of self-defense is 
the deference we accord the motivation of self-preservation, assuming 
the motivation was reasonably called into play. A motivation-based de­
fense, however, is one that is difficult for a justification picture of self­
defense to accommodate. In part III ,  I shall make a more robust argu­
ment for this claim, suggesting that the only clear motivation-based 
picture of justification available is the Hobbesian picture, and that 
modern law cannot accept the implications of that view. Before I turn 
to this argument, however, we must consider a bifurcation position 
which would not suffer from the particular defect of Fletcher's view: 
this is the claim that all of self-defense should be treated as a justifica­
tion, but that at least in the case of battered women, self-defense per se 
is not required to exonerate the defendant. On this view, battered 
women should be thought of as having an excuse, where the claim to 
excuse falls outside the ambit of self-defense. I shall argue, however, 
that this view suffers from other defects. 
B. An Excuse of Battered Woman Syndrome 
While the theory has hardly found favor with courts,36 some com-
36. See, e.g., Hawthorne v .  State, 408 So.2d 801 , 805 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1 982) (holding 
that battered woman syndrome testimony only properly introduced to bear on defendant's claim of 
self-defense, not to establish novel defense); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577 (Kan. 1 988)  
(" [N]o jurisdictions have held that the existence of  the battered woman syndrome in and of  itself 
operates as a defense to murder."). But see McMaugh v. State, 6 1 2  A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992 ) (sug-
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mentators have suggested t h e  creation o f  a special defense for battered 
women, what is sometimes referred to as the defense of "battered wo­
man syndrome. "37 Drawing on Lenore Walker's work in experimental 
psychology which purports to show the existence of a psychological syn­
drome specific to victims of domestic abuse,38 the novel defense would 
claim that battered women who kill their abusers should be regarded as 
lacking responsibility for their conduct. Such women, according to the 
syndrome, become helpless and passive, unable to leave the relationship 
and incapable of seeking help, even when help is available. 
The possible legal relevance of the syndrome, however, remains 
unclear. If the syndrome is meant to suggest a form of incapacity, the 
most obvious candidate for a theory of legal defense is lack of volunta­
riness, along the lines of defendants who perform otherwise criminal 
acts while unconscious, for example, in their sleep or during an epilep­
tic seizure.39 But lack of voluntariness usually means that the actor 
literally cannot control her bodily movements, and this is unlikely to be 
the case where the killing is conducted by an awake actor whose body 
is not moved by an external physical force, and where the movement is 
not a reflex reaction. A claim of incapacity applicable to such cases 
would thus be more like what the insane actor can claim -not that 
there is no voluntary act, but that there is no mens rea, because the 
defendant lacks the general capacity to form an evil intent. The more 
promising suggestion of incapacity, then, is that the battered woman 
has had her judgment clouded by the abuse she has suffered, and that 
her ability to think rationally about her alternatives has become im­
paired . In this way, the existence of the syndrome can only constitute 
the basis for a defense in its own right if there is a type of impairment 
which does not imply complete loss of agency, but which nevertheless 
destroys an agent's responsibility for her conduct. 
An initial difficulty is this. If past experiences are to have impaired 
the defendant's responsibility for conduct, they must h ave done so with 
respect to everything she does, not just at the moment she kills. And no 
gesting battered woman syndrome might be presented as affirmative defense to murder to defeat 
evidence of premeditation). 
37.  See, e.g., Mira Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome, 
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1 253 ,  1 280 ( 1 987)  (arguing dimin­
ished capacity proper plea for defendants displaying battered woman syndrome) . 
38 .  LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984 ) .  
39. See People v. Newton, 87 Cal. Rptr. 394, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 970) (unconsciousness 
complete defense to charge of criminal homicide as long as not voluntarily induced); People v. 
Graham, 455 P.2d 153 ,  1 6 1  (Cal. 1969) (same). 
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one has suggested, or would suggest, that a battered woman should be 
exonerated for any illegal act she might perform, although it has been 
suggested that the syndrome might have application to cases in which 
women commit crimes under duress from abusive husbands.40 This un­
derscores . the basic difference between the proposed battered woman 
syndrome defense and the insanity defense. What the proponent of a 
separate battered woman syndrome defense would require, then, is a 
theory under which a sane agent 's responsibility for her conduct can be 
destroyed, not in a permanent fashion, but destroyed only with respect 
to a particular act she performs, where the nature of the impairment 
leaves the act a voluntary one, in the sense the criminal law acknowl­
edges. Can we find examples of such a psychological middle road else­
where in our theory of voluntary action ? 
First consider cases of accidental harm. In some such cases the 
agent's behavior is intentional under some description, but not under 
the one in terms of which the behavior is harmful .  Thus I might stretch 
my arms intentionally, but I might not slap you in the face intention­
ally if I did not know that by stretching my arms I would slap you in 
the face. While I am responsible for stretching my arms, I am not re­
sponsible for slapping you in the face. But this sort of lack of responsi­
bility is hardly applicable to the situation of the battered woman who 
kills, since the battered woman, we are presuming, is aware of what she 
is doing, while the reason we can say I do not slap you in the face 
intentionally is that I lack awareness of slapping you in the face.41  In 
short, since the required mens rea for murder is not purpose, but at 
most knowledge, cases in which the defendant consciously controls her 
bodily movements will be ones in which it will be difficult to show lack 
of responsibility without alleging insanity. 
Coerced acts may provide a more promising model for the middle 
road the battered woman theorist needs. On one view of coercion, if a 
person holds a gun to your head and threatens to kill you unless you 
turn over your money, you lack responsibility for handing over your 
money, even though you are aware of what you are doing, since you 
hand over your money under duress. Perhaps, then, lack of responsibil-
40. See Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 
603 ( 1 994) . It would be equally difficult to limit the application of the syndrome to 'near duress' 
cases. 
4 1 .  This is at least the case in ordinary language and in the law. Philosophers have a nar­
rower (indeed too narrow, as I have suggested elsewhere) understanding of the notion of inten­
tional action. Claire Finkelstein, The Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Moral Culpabil­
ity: Comment on Moore, 76 B.U. L. REv. 2 1 0 1 ,  2 104 ( 1 996) .  
634 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol.  57:62 1 
ity can be inferred from a lack of "willingness," rather than from lack 
of control.42 But I think this understanding of coerced acts is itself un­
tenable.43 There is a clear sense in which the coercer is presenting you 
with a choice: while he has severely restricted your options there are 
still two things you can do under the circumstances . The point of re­
stricting your options is of course to make one course of action vastly 
more attractive to you than another. But this means that the coercer is 
relying on your intact powers of ratiocination, since he wants a particu­
lar course of action to recommend itself forcefully to your reason . Lack 
of rationality on your part would foil his plans. It is unclear, then, how 
pressure that does not destroy the possibility for intentional action is 
supposed to weaken the agent's responsibility. Indeed, your handing 
money over to the coercer seems more emblematic of agency than the 
case in which I unintentionally hit you in the face when I put on my 
coat:  At least in the former case there is something you want to which 
handing over money is a means, whereas in the latter, although I con­
trol the movements of my body by which I hit you in the face, there is 
nothing I am seeking to accomplish by doing so. 
Insofar as women who kill their abusers control their bodily move­
ments and are aware of what they are doing, then, they should be 
thought of as killing intentionally. The problem is that there is no co­
herent theory under which some agents who act both voluntarily and 
intentionally can be thought of as lacking responsibility for their con­
duct. The sort of defense required is one that applies to responsible 
agents, but which does not demand the stringent conditions of self-de­
fense on a justification theory of the defense. The notion of a "rational 
excuse " will play precisely this role -it applies to sane, responsible 
agents in virtue of a judgment made about the content of their reasons 
for acting. We shall explore the notion of "rational excuse" further in  
part V. 
III .  CONCEPTIONS OF JUSTIFICATION 
Thus far we have considered approaches to self-defense, and I 
have argued that the law currently adopts a motivation-based approach 
42. Aristotle rejects the suggestion. Although he calls actions performed under duress 
"mixed," he concludes that such acts are essentially voluntary, since "the principle that moves the 
instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in [the man,) and the things of which the moving 
principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do." ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean 
Ethics, in COLLECTED WORKS OF ARISTOTLE § 1 1 1 0 (b) (33-34) (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) . 









1 996] RATIONAL EXCUSE 635 
to that defense. If we side with the law on the nature of self-defense, 
the question arises whether the motivation-based approach to self-de­
fense is compatible with the background philosophical account we 
might give of justification. There is one clear approach to justification 
that hinges justification entirely on motivation.  This is the Hobbesian 
approach. 
For Hobbes, the right to act on the motive of self-preservation is 
the most essential of the rights that man has outside of civil society, 
and a state's ability to recognize it constitutes one of the central condi­
tions of legitimate political authority.  As David Gauthier in his contri­
bution to this symposium suggests, "A legal system which failed to rec­
ognize the right, which failed to recognize the j ustification each person 
has to act in her own protection in the light of imminent danger, could 
have no valid claim on the allegiance or obedience of those it sought to 
bring within its sway. "44 This thought is nowhere more seriously main­
tained than in Leviathan, where Hobbes argues that there are "some 
rights which no man can be understood by any words or other signs to 
have abandoned or transferred, " chief among them "the right of re­
sisting them that assault him by force . "411 So strong is the right to de­
fend one's life against attack, that it prevails even as against the sover­
eign, whose powers, Hobbes makes clear, are otherwise so extensive 
that "nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what 
pretense soever, can properly be called injustice, or injury. "46 Thus if 
the sovereign comes to kill me, I am at liberty to resist him, although 
he does not do me an injustice in trying to kil l  me. Similarly, Hobbes 
says that "[i]f the sovereign command a man (though justly con­
demned) to kill, wound, or maim himself, or not to resist those that 
assault him . . .  yet hath that man liberty to disobey. "47 Hobbes ap­
pears to have laid the foundation for the modern rights-based tenor of 
contemporary accounts of the defense. 
There is, however, a striking difference between the Hobbesian 
and the modern views of justified self-defense. As commentators gener­
ally agree, one mark of a justification is that the use of force in re­
sponse cannot itself be justified.4 8 This aspect of justification can be 
44. David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence, 57 U. PITT. L. REv. 
6 1 5, 6 1 6  ( 1 996) . 
45. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN ch. XIV, para. 8 ( 1994) ( 1 651). 
46. Id. at ch. XXI, para 7. 
47. I d. at ch. XXI, para 1 2. 
48. FLETCHER, supra note I, § I 0.1. 1 .  
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derived from the requirement, specific to self-defense, that the use of 
force by the initial aggressor must itself be unlawful.  But for Hobbes, 
the fact that the sovereign is justified in trying to kill me does not mean 
that I am not justified in resisting him. So we can have a situation in 
which two agents are attacking one another, each of whom is justified . 
Hobbes in effect rejects the requirement on justification that the use of 
force be unlawful . We shall return to differences between the Hobbes­
ian and modern views below .49 
What is uniquely modern about this conception is the idea that the 
legitimate scope of sovereignty is l imited by the background, prepoliti­
cal right of self-defense; in other words, that individual right provides 
the limiting principle against which the power of the state is defined. 
This follows axiomatically from the way in which the state is consti­
tuted - by agreement of its putative members - and the purpose for 
which such agreement is entered into - the improved security of one's 
life. In other words, self-defense provides the very condition for the 
willingness of individuals to leave the state of nature, and the scope of 
duty to the sovereign is limited by the latter's ability to fulfill  that pur­
pose: "The obligation of subjects to the sovereign is understood to last 
as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth by which he  is able to 
protect them. "�>0 Self-defense on a Hobbesian view is thus the essence 
of justification . 
The law of Hobbes's own day, however, and that stretching back 
to the Middle Ages, suggested a very different picture of justifica­
tion - in particular, a much narrower conception. Justified violations of 
the law were restricted to those committed by state agents, either as 
state officials or as private citizens representing the common good. The 
person who killed accidentally, under duress, or se defendendo, thus fel l  
outside the scope of justification. Accordingly, a person who had killed 
per infortunium or se defendendo required a pardon from the king,111 
whereas a jailer who killed an escaping prisoner or a private citizen 
who killed a felon in "hue and cry"112 would be acquitted if brought to 
justice at alP3 When the executioner put in motion the state's machin-
49. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67. 
50. HOBBES, supra note 45, at ch. XXI, para. 2 1 .  
5 1 .  2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W .  MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
479-83 ( 1 959) ( 1 895) .  
52 .  See id. at 478,  578-80. 
53 .  NAOMI D. HURNARD, THE KING'S PARDON FOR HOMICIDE BEFORE 1 307, at 88-90 
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ery of death, these were not the acts of  a man , but the acts of  the state 
which merely passed through the person of the executioner. 
In asserting a justification, then,  a defendant does not attempt to 
claim the law's protection for acts performed for self-interested reasons.  
H e  presents instead a privilege to act as a representative of the state, 
and it is the common welfare rather than individual self-interest that 
provides the grounds for the legitimacy of his act. Although the dispen­
sation of pardons became routinized and could eventually be expected 
as a matter of course where applicable,�4 the principle remained that he 
who claimed a defense for actions undertaken as a private, self-inter­
ested being could not demand the mantle of legal protection. Exonera­
tion for such acts thus was formally a matter of mercy rather than of 
justice,�� and one who was extraordinarily denied a pardon would have 
no legal claim for redress.  Exoneration for killings committed se 
defendendo and per infortunium remained a matter of pardon until rel­
atively late in the history of Anglo-American law.�6 
One finds the older view of justification in many of Hobbes's pred­
ecessors. St. Thomas Aquinas clearly limits the operation of justifica­
tion to state agents acting for the common good. In his Question on 
murder, for example, Aquinas allows that it is permissible in general to 
kil l  sinners, �7 but he restricts the permissibility of such killings to those 
undertaken by agents charged with the public welfare: "it is lawful to 
kill an evildoer in so far as it  is directed to the welfare of the whole 
community, so that it belongs to him alone who has charge of the com­
munity's welfare. "�8 And he goes on to say that "the care of the com­
mon good is entrusted to persons of rank having public authority: 
wherefore they alone, and not private individuals, can lawfully put evil-
54. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 3 13 (3d ed. 1927). 
55 .  This was set out formally in  the Statute of  Gloucester ( 1 278)  which enacted that one 
who lOlled se defendendo or otherwise "without felony" must plead to the justices in eyre or of 
gaol delivery, and "in case it be found by the country that he did it in his defence or by misfor­
tune, then by the report of the justices to the king the king shall take him to his grace if it please 
him." 6 Edw. 1, ch. 9 ( 1 278) (Eng.),  quoted in 3 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 54, at 3 1 2. 
56. It was not formally abolished until 1 828 .  9 Geo. 4, ch. 3 1 § 1 0  ( 1 8 28)  (Eng.) .  The 
Statute of Gloucester already either reflected or instituted a regularization of the pardon process; 
the defendant was instructed to request pardon under the statute even though these were by then 
pro forma. By the reign of Edward III, the declining importance of the power to pardon is evi­
denced by the fact that the Chancellor had taken over the process. RoLLIN M. PERKINS & RoN­
ALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 1 1 23-24 (3d ed. 1 982) .  
57.  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II ,  Q. 64,  art. 2 (Benziger Brothers, Inc., 
1 948) .  
58 .  !d. at II-II, Q. 64,  art. 3 .  
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doers to death . "119 While it is hardly surprising that Aquinas thought 
public executions lawful only when conducted by public authority, the 
impermissibility of private killings of evildoers must apply to other situ­
ations as well, since what is unlawful can never be made lawful for 
Aquinas by considerations of the greater good.60 The difficulty this cre­
ates for the theory of self-defense is clear: one can never hope to justify 
killing in self-defense, since this would be to allow that evil can be out­
weighed . Aquinas's famous attempt to explain the permissibility of self­
defense in terms of the fact that what is intended is saving one's l ife, 
while killing the aggressor is "beside the intention"61 is an effort to 
obviate the absolute prohibition on private killing without having to 
justify such killing . If justification is the only moral principle one has 
for exonerating intentional violations of a prohibitory norm, calling the 
conduct "unintentional" is the only remaining route to permissibility. 
As I am in effect suggesting, however, one might reject the antecedent 
of the conditional and locate a principle of permissibil ity in excuse 
instead. 
What is peculiarly modern about the Hobbesian view, then, is the 
supposition that acts of a person, qua individual,  self- interested being, 
can be the subject of justification . This supposition only became possi­
ble once individuals, as opposed to states, were viewed as sources of 
political legitimacy. Behind the difference between the modern and the 
medieval conceptions of justification lies a difference in the conception 
of the relation between state and individual authority. On an older, 
preindividualistic conception, there is no justification for individual self­
interest, because such interest bears no separate political l egitimacy. 
Although Aquinas himself does not appear to accept the suggestion, 
one might instead regard a privilege accorded individuals to protect 
their own, narrowly drawn interests as an expression of understanding 
or toleration, rather than as a limitation on state authority. 
The i mplications of the difference between these political concep­
tions for the right of self-defense are apparent: on the older conception 
of state authority, any right to self-defense must be accorded, as a mat­
ter of grace, by the political body itself, where the grounds for accord­
ing the right are the tendency of the right to enhance social welfare. 
59.  !d. 
60. According to Aquinas, this can be inferred from the fact that moral acts take their 
species from what is intended, id. at II-II, Q. 64, art. 7 ,  and that the means is also intended, id. at 
1-11 ,  Q. l 2, art. 3. 
6 1 .  /d. at II-II, Q. 12, art. 7. 
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On this view, the right of self-defense does not operate outside the 
realm of law; it is only available within that realm, and exists only to 
the extent required to realize the fullest well-being of the collective. 
The right of self-defense is thus one asserted not over and against state 
authority, but in conjunction with it. On a view which locates the 
source of state legitimacy in the prepolitical rights of individuals, by 
contrast, the source of justification is also prepolitical . In according a 
right of self-defense, on this view, the law merely recognizes that which 
already obtains, namely a natural right to pursue one's own preserva­
tion under any circumstances which threaten it.  
The current state of the Anglo-American law of justification lies 
midway between the Hobbesian picture of expansive justification for 
self-interested acts and the more limited, medieval view of justification. 
That is,  there are several respects in which the Hobbesian notion of 
justification is stronger than its modern counterpart. As noted above, it 
applies even in the face of force which 
·
is itself justified, so that I can be 
justified in defending myself against the sovereign, even though the sov­
ereign is justified in kil ling me.62 Moreover under our present jurispru­
dence, while killing an aggressor (whether culpable or not) in self-de­
fense is included in the ambit of justification, killing innocent 
bystanders when necessary for one's survival generally is not .63 Our 
current jurisprudence thus contains an asymmetry: private necessity is 
recognized for kil ling unlawful aggressors, under the heading "self-de­
fense," but not for actions taken against nonaggressors. This is so even 
when the violation against the latter is trivial in nature, such as stealing 
a loaf of bread to keep from starving. On a H obbesian view of justifica­
tion, by contrast, there is no basis for restricting actions taken in de­
fense of one's life to self-defense: individuals can use whatever means 
are necessary to defend their lives, even those directed against non­
aggressors .64 As Hobbes says, "If a man, by the terror of present death, 
be compelled to do a fact against the law, he is totally excused, because 
no law can oblige a man to abandon his own preservation."611 And Hob­
bes goes on to apply this reasoning to cases in which "a man is desti-
62. See supra text accompanying note 48 .  
63.  See Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 ( 1 884) (Eng) (rejecting defense of 
private necessity for defendants who cannibalized innocent cabin boy in life boat) . 
64. The Hobbesian rationale is thus to be distinguished from more moderate rights-based 
approaches. See generally Thomson, supra note 3 (distinguishing killing of aggressors and persons 
presenting an innocent threat from killing of innocent bystanders) .  
65 .  HOBBES, supra note 45,  a t  ch. XXVII ,  para. 25 .  
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tute of food or other thing necessary for his life, and cannot preserve 
himself any other way but by some fact against the law. "66 
The comparably weak conception of j ustification of our current ju­
risprudence reflects, I think, a certain ambivalence about self-interested 
reasons for acting and an uncertainty about the scope of the privilege 
to which they should give rise. On the one hand, it fails to embrace the 
wholesale privilege for self-interest of the Hobbesian picture, but it also 
eschews the rejection of the privilege of self-interest that we find in 
medieval law. The uneasy compromise our legal jurisprudence makes is 
to limit the privilege of self- interested reasons to actions undertaken 
against one who is himself the source of the threat to one's survival.  
But it is unclear that a rationale for this compromise can be given. 
Another sort of rights-based approach to self-defense more easily 
explains the asymmetry between aggressors and nonaggressors : so­
called "forfeiture" theorists maintain that aggressors forfeit the right 
to life (or, as in Judy Thomson's famous variation, the right not to be 
killed by the person attacked67) ,  whereas innocent bystanders do not. 
But it is a well-known difficulty with such theories that it  is hard to see 
why innocent aggressors should be thought to forfeit such a right. The 
answer typically given is that even innocent aggressors are "wronging" 
the person they attack.68 But if "wronging" is meant to imply anything 
in the nature of a negative moral judgment, it is not clear why it should 
apply to innocent aggressors. If no such implication is meant, then why 
should it apply only to aggressors, and not also to nonaggressing 
threats ?69 And if, indeed, one is willing to go further and apply it to 
nonaggressing threats, what precisely is the basis for denying its appli­
cation to innocent bystanders ? At any rate, the forfeiture theory is be­
yond the scope of our present concerns, s ince we are attempting to dis­
cover a rationale for a defense premised on the motivation of the agent 
employing defensive force. In its focus on the nature of the aggressor, 
66. Jd. at ch. XXVII,  para. 26. 
67. See Thomson, supra note 3. 
68. Grotius, Puffendorf, and many others in this line treat the right to kill in self-defense as 
requiring some injustice on the part of the attacker. But since all wish to extend the right of self­
defense to cases of insane, incompetent, or mistaken aggressors, they too require a conception of 
injustice which leaves a significant gap between that notion and notions like fault or culpability. 
The required conception of "injustice," however, is never clearly articulated, and it is not clear it 
can be. For a helpful discussion of this point, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING ch. 4 
( 1 994 ) .  
6 9 .  For this reason, some have concluded that self-defense i s  not permissible against insane 
and incompetent aggressors. See generally Otsuka, supra note 3 .  
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forfeiture theories are not potential candidates for providing the 
sought-after rationale. 
IV. S E L F-DEFENSE O N  A W ELFARIST CoNCEPTION 
A rejection of the Hobbesian picture of justification, along with a 
focus on motivation, does not by itself suggest that self-defense should 
be thought of as an excuse. On the picture of justification we have from 
medieval law, one might argue that killing in self-defense should never­
theless be considered justified killing, on the grounds that in self-de­
fense self-interest and social welfare coincide. On what we might call 
the "welfarist" conception of justification, violations of the law that 
promote social welfare are to be encouraged, regardless of the motiva­
tion with which they are performed. Although contemporary interpre­
tations of "promoting social welfare" will no doubt suggest a utilitarian 
account, we need not take such a view. The welfarist picture refers only 
to the privileging of what it is good to do over what it is permissible to 
do, a focus on well-being over rights.  My claim, then, is that the tradi­
tional notion of justification is welfarist. But now it remains to be con­
sidered why a welfarist view of justification cannot accept self-defense 
as a justification . 
The obvious first attempt to treat self-defense in welfarist terms is 
the argument that as between a wrongful aggressor and an innocent 
victim, society prefers that the wrongful aggressor lose her life than 
that the innocent victim lose his. Self-defense may thus appear to meet 
the primary welfarist test, namely the endorsement of the defendant's 
behavior. There are reasons, however, to reject this account of self-de­
fense, the most obvious of which is the persistence of the right in cases 
of insane or otherwise excused aggressors. In such cases, the law cannot 
plausibly claim that it has a preference for preserving the life of the 
victim, or if the claim might be heard, sotto voce in the case of insane 
aggressors, it surely will not hold up in the case of infantile, but other­
wise normal, aggressors. 
But here again the asymmetry with cases of necessity is instruc­
tive. An agent is typically justified in committing arson to save lives, or 
even in killing one to save many, but never in killing one to save one. 
Even the lesser evils defense, then, does not seem to take into account 
relative worth of lives and so does not express a preference in the one­
for-one situation. As we have seen, however, the toting up of benefits 
and burdens does not always determine permissibility - I may not steal 
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a loaf of bread to keep from starving.70 And this suggests that promo­
tion of social welfare is not by itself sufficient to justify a violation of a 
prohibitory norm, but that one requires "authorization" to represent 
the public good before the promotion of social welfare can provide a 
justification . Thus, if self-defense were treated in the same way as ne­
cessity, it could not be counted a justification by dint of consequential­
ist reasoning, not only because the lowest common denominator meth­
odology makes the defense applicable to one innocent victim who kills 
one excused aggressor, but also because we do not determine the per­
missibility of action undertaken for private benefit by a weighing up of 
evils. 
There is,  moreover, another reason for rej ecting a j ustification pic­
ture of self-defense on a welfarist conception of justification, and this 
has to do with the nature of obligation. Killing performed for the sake 
of others' welfare presents a possible fulfillment of obligation: although 
the law usually recognizes no duty to rescue, it would not be antitheti­
cal to the nature of moral obligation to impose such a duty. Cases of 
justified public necessity are ones in which such a duty would apply; 
one might have a duty to burn a field to save a town or to steal a boat 
to rescue a drowning child.  In such a case we could explain the justified 
nature of the violation by saying the agent had a moral obligation to do 
the prohibited thing, since an otherwise prohibited act which an agent 
has an obligation to perform must be more than m erely excused; it 
must be justified. But killing in self-defense could never be an obliga­
tion; it can at most be a privilege or a right .71  A person who would 
rather die than kill is  surely permitted to do so, and this should be true, 
even if we are inclined to regard suicide as morally prohibited. Simi­
larly, a person who would rather starve to death than steal a loaf of 
bread should not be thought of as under an obligation to steal the 
bread. A person, on the other hand, who would rather refrain from 
destroying an item of clothing needed as a tourniquet to save another 
from bleeding to death could be acting immorally. 
The asymmetrical nature of possible obligations in the above cases 
suggests that whatever right the law or morality may accord us to act 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64. The situation is obviously somewhat different 
in tort law, where it is generally accepted that private necessity negates fault. But even so, the 
defendant is required to compensate the victim for damage to the latter's property. Vincent v. 
Lake Erie, 1 24 N.W. 221  (Minn. 1 9 1 0) (requiring boat owner to compensate owner of wharf for 
damage to latter when vessel tied up at wharf to find safety from storm) .  
7 1 .  See McMahan, supra note 3,  at 261  (suggesting that on  deontological view, decision not 
to act in self-defense cancels any reason to prevent injustice of her being killed) . 
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in defense of our lives is considerably weaker than the right we might 
have to defend others or society at large. This is not to say that we may 
not regard a person who chooses to save her life rather than be killed in 
a favorable light . We might, for example, think her rational or prudent. 
But the sort of goodness that inheres in prudent behavior is not much 
stronger than the sort of goodness that inheres in other natural acts 
required for self-preservation:  just as we sleep when we are tired, we 
defend ourselves when under attack. One deserves no special accolades 
for doing what it is natural to do. By contrast, the individual who does 
a good deed for a third party does something which deserves moral 
praise. He does what cuts against the grain of natural selfishness. Indi­
viduals are encouraged to act in defense of the common good; such 
conduct is more than merely tolerated. Where disinterested pursuit of 
social welfare requires a person to break the law, the law may extend 
the person a justification. The basis for extending a j ustification, how­
ever, must be narrowly drawn . It applies only where the state is un­
available to act on its own behalf, since the dangers associated with 
allowing individual judgment to substitute for public judgment are sig­
nificant. For this reason, the substitution is allowed only where the con­
tent of the public judgment is clear, where the individual is in an ap­
propriate position to represent public welfare, and where the state is 
completely and absolutely barred by circumstances from making the 
judgment itself. 
Where an individual's reason for violating a prohibitory norm is 
self-interested, the judge of the necessity for the violation and the bene­
ficiary of that act are one. By extension of the principle that no one 
should be j udge in his own cause, the person who kills in self-defense is 
not the appropriate judge of the justifiability of the use of force. From 
a certain perspective, it is not only inappropriate to think of one's claim 
for self-defense as establishing a j ustification; it is outrageous.  Why 
should I be able to insist that the preservation of my life is important 
for social welfare, j ust because it is important to me? This suggests 
that the person who acts in self-defense should be thought of as ex­
cused rather than j ustified, since his deeply interested relation to the 
victim bars him from asserting the obj ective value of his act. 
The heart of the position I am attempting to sketch can thus be 
put as follows : a right premised on a self-regarding reason is weaker 
than one premised on an other-regarding reason. Since the right to kill 
in self-defense is of the self-regarding variety, it should be j urispruden­
tially distinguished, for example, from the right we have to defend 
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third parties, which is other-regarding. My suggestion is that the his­
torical distinction between prima facie evil acts merely excused by self­
interest and those justified by the demands of the common good cap­
tures this moral difference. 
V. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS 
Conceiving of self-defense as an excuse has certain interesting doc­
trinal implications for the legal theory of the defense.  There is, first of 
all, a difficulty in the justification picture of self-defense which the ex­
cuse account obviates, stemming from two widely accepted features of 
justification . The first is that already discussed, namely that there is no 
right to resist the j ustified use of force,72 and the other is that justifica­
tions give rise to a right of third-party assistance. 73 If these features are 
taken to be essential to the notion of justification, however, the follow­
ing problem infects cases of mistaken actors . 
Suppose A attacks B, thinking erroneously, but reasonably, that B 
is about to attack him. On a justification picture, then, it is not permis­
sible for B to respond with force to A's attack, since A is purportedly 
j ustified. But since A is wrongfully, although excusedly,  attacking, B 
should have a right of self-defense against A. And this requires that we 
think of A as excused, rather than j ustified . Of course for Fletcher this 
would be another argument in favor of bifurcation . But if we rej ect 
bifurcation, as I have argued we should,74 the preferred solution is to 
regard both parties in the above case as excused . 
Alternatively, one might retain the essential unity of standard and 
putative self-defense within a j ustification picture by siding with Hob­
bes on the question of resistance: justification need not be regarded as 
silencing a right of resistance. The problem with this solution is that it  
would generate a right to resist law-enforcement officials in the execu­
tion of their duty, something Hobbes presumably thinks he can limit to 
defense of life and bodily integrity by the particularly powerful nature 
of his sovereign.711 In the absence of the very strong notion of sover-
72. See supra text accompanying note 48 and sources cited therein. 
73 .  See FLETCHER, supra note I, § 1 0. 1 . 1 .  
74. See supra text accompanying notes 27-35 .  
75 .  Hobbes i s  slightly unclear on  this point. He suggests that the right of  resistance stems 
from the fact that any covenant "not to defend a man's own body are void."  H OBBES, supra note 
45, at ch. XXI, para. II. Such a principle would, in theory, limit the right of resistance only to 
those things, as Hobbes suggests, "without which [a man) cannot live." /d. at ch. XXI, para 1 2 . 
But earlier he also suggests that a contract to be put in chains would be void, on the grounds that 
the contractor "cannot be understood to aim thereby at any good to himself." /d. at ch. XIV, 
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eignty that Hobbes suggests, regarding justified force as legitimately 
resisted would make political authority unwieldy, to say the least . 
On a view of self-defense as an excuse, however, there remains the 
foliowing problem. Since individuals have no right to respond with 
force to the justified use of force, but they may respond with force if 
the original use of force is only excused, it  looks as though the original 
aggressor will have the right to defend himself against the victim who 
is defending herself against him. And this seems problematic, since it 
produces an infinite regress of permissible uses of force. I think, how­
ever, that the excuse theorist has an answer, which lies in the fact that 
the original aggressor's right to defend himself is only parasitic on his 
own wrongful attacking. The aggressor has a duty to desist from his 
attack, and therefore his use of force against the now attacking victim 
can only be legitimate to the extent it  exists apart from his own wrong­
ful aggression. This means that where the victim's responses are neces­
sary to protect herself against attack and are proportionate to the end 
of doing so, the original aggressor's response to her will not be 
legitimate. 
A second potential problem emerges from the absence of a right of 
third-party assistance. It is clearly permissible for third parties to come 
to the aid of someone exercising a legitimate right of self-defense. And 
it is commonly thought that a third-party right of assistance must be 
derived from a first-party right of self-defense. But unlike justifications, 
excuses do not generate rights of assistance in others. So the excuse 
picture of self-defense seems problematic, for it appears to deny a right 
of third-party assistance when it should allow it.  But we need not ac­
cept the dependence of the third party's right of assistance on the first 
party's right of self-defense.  On an excuse conception, the right answer 
is that it is only the person whose interests are at stake that is barred 
from asserting a claim of justification for his own self-preserving ac­
tions . Third parties are justified in assisting a person wrongfully at­
tacked, insofar as they are in a position to render an independent judg­
ment about the necessity of using force to protect the victim of the 
attack. Thus a third party can assist, and is justified in doing so, even 
though the grounds for her assistance are not derivative of the first 
party's right of self-protection. This helps solve a problem which is 
para. 8 .  The point is puzzling, because it is easy to imagine a contract to be imprisoned which 
would be to the advantage of the prisoner, for example, if the alternative were death. Moreover, it 
seems that the suggestion would expand the right of resistance to law-enforcement almost without 
limit. 
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comparable to the right of resistance problem we saw above: If the 
rights of third parties were entirely dependent on the rights of first par­
ties, there would be a problem on a justification picture of self-defense, 
since it seems as though third parties would have a right to assist actors 
mistaken in their right to use defensive force, and that this right would 
obtain even if the third party knew the first party was mistaken. But 
obviously third parties cannot ride on the coattails of first parties . The 
permissibility of using force will depend entirely on the j udgment of the 
third party about the merits of the situation with which she is 
confronted. 
The law has always been unsure of its response to a third party's 
rights where the person asserting defensive force is reasonably mistaken 
about the need to use force, and the third party knows him to be mis­
taken. It is also unclear what a third party should do where the initial 
aggressor is excused because of infancy or insanity, and where the third 
party is aware of the excuse. The third party should clearly not have a 
right to intervene by way of assisting the mistaken actor (a  result that 
supports the argument against calling mistaken actors j ustified) . But 
the third party may not have a right to intervene on the side of the 
victim either. I t  is similarly unclear whether a third party can assist the 
victim of an attack by an incompetent, and equally unclear whether she 
can assist the initial aggressor against the victim's counterattack. This 
ambivalence, however, is not peculiar to an excuse picture of self-de­
fense; the justification picture is similarly uncertain in its response. In 
general, the rights of third parties are not affected by the move from 
justification to excuse. 
Here, however, is a possible exception . Suppose a third party 
comes to the rescue of an individual under attack, where the third 
party's welfare is just an extension of the first party's, so that in pro­
tecting the first party, the third party is maximizing her own interests 
as wel l .  Thus if I am a parent and my child is the individual under 
attack, my defense of my child can hardly be thought a disinterested 
act I perform for the sake of the common good. My welfare is so intrin­
sically bound up with the welfare of my child, that one must regard my 
attempt to save my child as a self-interested act on my part . Yet it  
must be the case that I have a justification, s ince it may be that I have 
a duty to save my child, and I am clearly justified in doing what duty 
requires. This case, then, presents a challenge to the view I have been 
suggesting, since the third party's interest in the first party's welfare is 
at least partially self- interested. And if it is self-interested, the defense 
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should be excuse. But it is clearly unacceptable to treat a parent who 
rescues her child as merely excused, and to treat her as justified if she 
rescues a stranger. Apart from the obvious implausibility of such a re­
sult, what would we do with more distant relatives and mere 
acquaintances ? 
I think there is, however, a basis for treating the parent as justified 
when she rescues her child, despite the partially self-interested nature 
of the act: the parent's behavior is still other-regarding, and thus the 
action should be justified, not merely excused. Moreover, dividing the 
cases in this way comports with the test from duty: the parent poten­
tially has a duty to rescue her child, and the claim from duty is no 
weaker here than it is with respect to a stranger; indeed, it is stronger. 
This is in sharp contrast to a truly self-regarding action which, I have 
suggested, cannot be the basis for duty. Kant of course thought that an 
action otherwise in accord with duty loses its moral worth if it is done 
for self-interested reasons,  and thus he would argue that only the res­
cue of someone the agent was not already inclined to rescue would have 
moral worth .76 But on a social welfare conception of justification, the 
inclination to do one's duty would not detract from the socially benefi­
cial character of acts such as parents defending their children. 
VI. SELF-DEFENSE AS A RATIONAL ExcusE 
Between endorsement and lack of responsibility there is tolera­
tion - toleration of an agent on the grounds that her reason for doing 
what she did is comprehensible to us. To excuse conduct of this sort 
does not suggest that we would wish the agent to behave the same way 
next t ime-we may view her behavior in a negative light or we may be 
indifferent. It does suggest, however, that we regard the behavior as 
permissible, that we do not fault her for acting on that reason. The 
notion of rational excuse is meant to occupy this middle ground. 
Rational excuse is distinguishable from other sorts of excuses by 
the fact that it applies to an agent's reason for acting. It is inapplicable 
when the agent had no reason for doing what she did, i .e .  when the 
conduct was not intentional. It requires an inquiry into the content of 
an agent's reason for acting, and asks whether we can exonerate an 
agent for wrongdoing on the grounds that she did the bad deed with a 
certain end in view. In the case of self-defense, the defendant claims 
76. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 398 (Paton trans., 
1 948, rpt. 1 956) .  
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she violated a norm protecting life and bodily integrity because she be­
lieved it was necessary for her to do so for the sake of self-preservation. 
Hobbes was indeed partially correct in the privileged position he as­
signed to such a motive: we are inclined to give great weight to pleas of 
self-interest where survival is at issue. But Hobbes was wrong to sup­
pose that this privilege need itself be thought of as supplying a basis for 
justifying prima facie wrongful acts. In the absence of a duty to save 
one's own l ife, a permission to harm another for the sake of self-preser­
vation need not amount to a justification for doing so. 
In suggesting that an excuse of personal necessity should turn on 
the content of an agent's reason for acting, I am impli citly proposing 
that we conduct the fol lowing two inquiries: first, we must consider 
whether the agent passes some minimum threshold of rationality - the 
minimum required to view the agent as having acted intention­
ally - and second, we must determine whether the agent honestly acted 
for the sake of one particular reason for acting - namely, self-preserva­
tion. In the case of self-defense, however, there is a third constraint of 
rationality that must be satisfied : not only must the a gent be under­
stood as having acted to protect her life, but she must have been rea­
sonable in her belief that the use of force was necessary for the accom­
plishment of that end .  
Some commentators who focus o n  motivation i n  explaining self­
defense dispense with the reasonableness requirement. Glanville Wil­
liams, for example, maintains that an honest belief in the need to use 
defensive force, plus the satisfaction of an imminence condition is the 
correct set of requirements for the defense.77 Some older cases support 
the proposition.78 But a defense that consists in an evaluation of a de­
fendant's reason for acting need not dispense with a normative inquiry 
into whether the motivation was appropriately arrived at under the cir­
cumstances . If a defendant sincerely believes that she must kill in order 
to save her life under conditions that a reasonable person would not 
regard as threatening, the law must reject her claim of self-defense. 
The excuse-based structure need not alter the normative aspect of sub­
stantive self-defense doctrine. It merely places that aspect in a different 
framework. 
Applying an excuse theory of self-defense to the situation of bat­
tered women does not automatically result in acquittal for such defend-
77 .  WILLIAMS, supra note 26,  at 504. 
78. See. e.g., Granger v .  State, ! 3 Tenn. 459 ( 1 8 30). 
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ants . Norman may still be judged unreasonable in her belief in the 
need to use defensive force under the circumstances . The significant 
advantage of the excuse formulation for defendants like Norman is that 
exoneration need not imply approval.  A defendant's possibly exagger­
ated response to a threatening situation can be judged as understanda­
ble, and hence exonerating, even if a jury is prepared to regard the 
defendant's behavior as less than fully admirable. The framework of 
excuse would thus allow flexible application of the power of a sympa­
thetic jury to exonerate . In this way, the extra-legal intuitions many 
seem to have about such cases would find expression in the law. While 
Anglo-American law is typically uncomfortable with doctrines that ad­
mit of individualized application, I have been concerned to suggest that 
such an approach may already be implicit in our moral intuitions about 
self-defense. 
